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Abstract 
 
The right to Freedom of Expression, as guaranteed by the Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, is one of the most fundamental elements for the 
perseverance of democracy and further development of the society.  Without the right 
to receive, and therefore, impart information, most other rights are rendered useless. 
However, significance of the same degree is also afforded to the right to Private Life 
and Reputation, which can be found to be protected by the Article 8 of the respective 
Convention. This thesis will argue that particularly these two rights have to be 
balanced out in order to create a comprehensible law that is able to efficiently tackle 
defamation, while at the same time not disproportionately restrict the free flow of 
information and ideas.  
Furthermore, this thesis scrutinizes the situation in the European Union regarding 
defamation, addressing the overwhelming amount of member states choosing to 
eliminate defamation by prosecuting the press under the national criminal codes. Such 
approach does not comply with the international standards thus demands for complete 
abolishment.  For the purpose of examining the potential for the civil law achieving 
the desired ends, three different approaches (the UK, Ireland and the US) are chosen 
and the best elements each of them can offer are determined. In the conclusion the 
view that criminal provisions dealing with defamation constitute a threat to 
democracy is affirmed and some minimum essential elements necessary to be 
included in a potential civil legislation are set forth. 
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ECHR, the Convention – European Convention of Human Rights 
ECtHR, the Court – European Court of Human Rights 
EU, EU28– the European Union 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research statement: Existence and potential abuse of criminal laws addressing 
defamation limits and endangers the right to freedom of expression, which is 
necessary in a democratic society, and the possibility of civil laws tackling 
defamation. 
In the 21st century, when the press is being attacked, threatened and even discredited 
by governments around the western world, another look at the so-called Fourth Estate
1
 
of democracy has to be taken. The right to Freedom of Expression has been one of the 
driving elements in the development of society as it is today. The ability to impart and 
receive information, especially concerning matters of public interest, is of utmost 
importance if any progress is to take place. However, equal significance is also 
afforded to the right to private life and reputation. This liberty provides the ability to 
lead a life without undue interference from the government, as well as that from other 
members of the society. Evidently, these two rights collide, and such conflict requires 
putting limits upon each of them, and as a result some forms of expression fall outside 
the scope of protection, and must be followed by legal consequences. One of such 
reasonably unprotected types of expression is “defamation of character”, it can be 
described as a  
[..] false statement someone makes about you, which they publish as a statement of 
fact, and which harms your personal and/or professional reputation or causes you 
other damages, including financial loss and emotional distress.
2
 
However, the definition and understanding of defamation vary around the developed 
world as some countries place more weight on the right to freedom of expression, but 
others offer stronger protection to the right to reputation and are willing to eliminate 
potentially “defamatory statements” even by enacting criminal provisions in their 
national legislation. Such position taken by the courts and governments in European 
Union is fairly alarming and demands comprehensive change in overall approach to 
this issue. The fact that almost all EU member states lack behind in universal 
standards of freedom of expression is an indicator that some form of legislation, 
applying minimum requirements to bring a defamation case in courts and also laying 
out basic legal tools available to defendants for battling such claims, is necessary.  
This paper will argue where the right balance between the two competing rights 
mentioned above is, and how this balance could be enforced in the EU member states. 
For this purpose, the first part of the thesis will determine the scope of freedom of 
expression, which is afforded by the European Convention of Human Rights by 
examining the respective case law produced by the European Court of Human Rights, 
which is binding upon the European Union members, therefore shall be adequately 
                                                 
1
The term fourth estate is used to describe the press. Describing journalists and the news outlets for 
which they work as members of the fourth estate is an acknowledgment of their influence and status 
among the greatest powers of a nation. [online] Available at: https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-the-
fourth-estate-3368058, Accessed May 17, 2018 
2
 Goguen, David, and J.D. "What Is Defamation of Character?”, [online], Available at: 
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/civil-litigation/defamation-character.html, Accessed at: May 14, 
2018 
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followed. The second part will clarify the unacceptable defamation situation that 
currently prevails in the EU, where the law goes as far as provides imprisonment, and 
why such approach can threaten the foundation of democracy. The third part will 
begin with an overlook of comprehensive civil defamation legislations of two 
European jurisdictions, namely the United Kingdom and Ireland, and then turn to the 
approach of the United States to present a considerably different method of handling 
claims of potential defamation. Forth part will consider the possibility of introducing 
self-regulatory bodies in the field of journalism, which are able to enforce 
“responsible journalism” practices as laid out by the journalistic code of ethics, and 
consequently address potential defamation claims. In the conclusion, the thesis will 
answer the research statement that has been posed by looking at its two parts and 
introduce a draft proposal that highlights the necessary elements of defamation 
specific legislation. 
2. THE SCOPE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AS ESTABLISHED BY THE 
ECHR CASE LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
The first paragraph of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(hereinafter – the ECHR or the Convention) states that everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, i.e. “hold opinions and receive and impart information without 
interference”, however, the second paragraph puts constraints on this right by adding 
that this freedom carries with it duties and responsibilities.
3
 To understand what this 
right covers in practice and what does not fall under its protection, European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter – the ECtHR or the Court) has developed a substantial 
amount of case law that establishes binding and persuasive precedents within its 
jurisdiction. This chapter will look at some of the more significant ones in the field of 
freedom of expression and defamation of character, insult and infringement of rights 
under the Article 8
4
 of the respective Convention, which protects the right to respect 
for private and family life to arrive at a theoretical and practical conclusion of what 
constitutes a violation of laws concerning defamation of character. 
2.2 Conflict with Article 8 and restrictions laid out in 
paragraph 2 of the Article 10 
Article 10 is far from the only right that is protected by the Convention, one of the 
most cited rights concerning defamation is safeguarded by Article 8 of the ECHR, 
which sets forth the right to respect for one's private and family life. This Article 
applies to everyone with disregard to their public standing or level of recognition, 
however; also this right is not absolute as the second paragraph of Article 8 narrows 
                                                 
3
 European Convention of Human Rights, Article 10 
4
 ECHR, Article 8 
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the given protection by stating that it could be limited in accordance with the law and 
if such limitation is necessary in a democratic society.
5
  
To balance these two rights in Von Hannover
6
 case the Court developed a five – step 
analysis that provides assistance to further explain the reasoning in a particular case 
concerning the limits of the right to freedom of expression and the right to private life. 
This case has to do with a public figure appearing in a publication that with the help 
of pictures shows the scenes from person's private life rather than the exercise of her 
official duties. This applicant brought the case to German Court system claiming the 
right to private life and received a dissatisfactory ruling referring to the freedom of 
press and the legitimate interest of society to observe how public persons behave. The 
case afterwards was brought to the ECtHR, which had to determine whether the 
rendered decision by German Courts violated person's rights under the Article 8 of the 
Convention by exercising a lack of protection in regards to her personal life. The 
Court, however, took a different approach to the case and as mentioned above 
established 5 points to go through to balance the two conflicting rights present in this 
case: (1) Whether the information contributes to a debate of general interests; (2) 
Whether the concerned person is well known; (3) The prior conduct of the concerned 
person; (4) The content, form and consequences of the relevant publication; (5) The 
circumstances under which the photos were taken.
7
 These points have been further 
reflected in case law of the Court as well as national courts throughout the Union. 
This case also established a precedent in regards to distinction between photographs 
and text as the Court claimed that these particular photographs did not concern 
dissemination of "ideas", but rather intimate “information” about the applicant and 
had nothing to do with the article itself.   
Several elements concerning freedom of expression have been added with the case 
law in this respect, for example, in the case Armoniene v. Lithuania
8
 the Court ruled 
that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention although the case 
already was decided in favour of the applicant, the amount awarded in pecuniary 
damages was contested in the Court and when addressing the specific point, the 
decision stated that the respective publication “cannot be deemed to contribute to any 
debate of general interest of society"
9
. It was strongly emphasized that this was 
partially because the case concerned a publication uncovering the information of a 
family member having HIV/AIDS, this family; furthermore, lived in a small village, 
therefore information of such nature could lead to "opprobrium and the risk of 
ostracism"
10
. Furthermore, the fact that such information can be found in a large 
national newspaper could have impacted the eagerness of somebody willing to test 
himself for the particular virus
11
. This case shows that dramatic effect on somebody's 
                                                 
5
 European Convention of Human Rights, Article 8 s 2 
6
 Von Hannover v Germany, (no. 2), nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, 7 February 2012 
7
 Ibid., para 109-113 
8
 Armoniene v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, 25 November 2008 
9
 Ibid., para  44 
10
 Ibid., para  40 
11
 Ibid., para  44 
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private and family life, including possible exclusion from society, outweighs the 
public's right to information, even if it is found to be factually true. Another precedent 
set forward by the Court in this case manifests the significance of rights protected 
under Article 8 of the Convention as the Court found that award in defamation cases 
should not only be about “redressing the damage suffered by the victim” but also 
about “sufficiently deterring the recurrence of such abuses”12.  
Furthermore, In Petrenco v Moldova
13
 case the Court clarified its position on the 
difference of public and private persons in respect to defamation in paragraph 55 of 
the decision stating that: 
in cases concerning debates or questions of general public interest, the extent of 
acceptable criticism is greater in respect of politicians or other public figures than in 
respect of private individuals: the former, unlike the latter, have voluntarily exposed 
themselves to a close scrutiny of their actions by both journalists and the general 
public and must therefore show a greater degree of tolerance
14
.  
In the same case, the Court also repeated the distinction between statements of fact 
and value judgments by asserting that  
[..]while the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is 
not susceptible of proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is 
impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental 
part of the right secured by Article 10
15
.  
This gives journalists and other press and media workers, as well as outlets 
themselves available defence when it comes to opinions, which may infringe upon 
someone's right to reputation or not reflect the factual truth fully, at least not in a way 
which requires objective proof. Nevertheless, even value judgments cannot be created 
out of thin air; there must be a sufficient factual basis to support the claims. This 
distinction, however, must be determined by the domestic courts as it is considered to 
fall under margin of appreciation principle established by the ECtHR.  
Another view that the Court has taken in its rulings such as Fressoz and Roire v 
France
16
 is that the Article 10 of the Convention leaves the decision to determine the 
credibility of available information and whether such information should then be 
made accessible to much wider public in the hands of the press. Paragraph 54 of the 
respective decision states that Article 10 
[..]protects journalists' right to divulge information on issues of general interest 
provided that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and 
provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism.
17
  
                                                 
12
 Ibid., para  47 
13
 Petrenco v Moldova, no. 20928/05, 30 March 2010 
14
 Ibid., para 55 
15
 Ibid., para 56 
16
 Fressoz and Roire v France, no. 29183/95, 26 May 1997 
17
 Ibid., para 54 
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This wording grants some armour to press as it does not have to guarantee the truth of 
the facts already publicly available. The Court also reiterated that people of certain 
public standing do not have the same protection as private individuals in regards to 
publication of financial assets and their availability. This is only logical as the 
society's interest in transparency of those holding high offices outweighs the right to 
complete financial privacy. 
One of the landmark rulings in cases touching upon the freedom of expression is the 
Handyside v UK
18
, where the Court considered the legality of confiscation of a book 
targeting teenagers, which contained chapters on sex, masturbation, contraceptives, 
menstruations, pornography, homosexuality, abortion and other matters of high 
sensitivity in the year of 1976. Although the confiscation was found not to violate 
freedom of expression as established by the Convention, because of the Obscenity 
laws in force at the time in the United Kingdom, this particular ruling still set an 
important precedent as it was one of the first cases concerning Article 10 of the 
Convention. In the ruling, the Court made it clear that  
[its] supervisory functions oblige[s] it to pay the utmost attention to the principles 
characterising a "democratic society". Freedom of expression constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress 
and for the development of every man
19
.  
The Court went even further saying that it 
[..] is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of 
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic 
society"
20
.  
If the state, however, decides in favour of restricting the right to expression in a form 
including those of "formality", "condition", "restriction" or "penalty", it is responsible 
to ensure that the restriction is proportionate and adequate in achieving the legitimate 
aim that is pursued.                                      
Furthermore, regarding the adequacy of proposed restrictions, in the case Plon v 
France
21
 the Court found a violation under Article 10 by the French Courts in their 
decision to prohibit the distribution of a book containing sensitive information about 
former French president Mitterrand.  The book did contain confidential medical 
information about the deceased president's diagnosis and treatment of cancer, 
however, an infinite ban on information of public interest that has already been made 
available and consumed by readers does not constitute a pressing social need to 
protect deceased's right to intimacy and honour as ruled by the Court. As an interim 
                                                 
18
Handyside v UK, no. 5493/72, 7 December 1976  
19
Ibid.  , para 49 
20
Ibid. 
21
 Plon v. France, no. 56148/00, 18 May 2004 
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measure it was deemed appropriate, but almost nine months later the ban already 
created a restriction that was no longer legal under ECHR.
22
 
Another case important for understanding the legal limits of freedom of expression is 
concerned with the publication of an image of a suspect of an ongoing criminal 
investigation Sciacca v Italy
23
. A newspaper in Italy publicized a photography 
containing a private school teacher, which was a suspect of criminal activities 
committed while managing the school affairs. The Court makes a distinction between 
private and public person in this case, concluding that "that the applicant was not 
someone who featured in a public context (public figure or politician)"
24
, but more 
importantly she was the subject of ongoing criminal proceedings, therefore 
publication could possibly lead to biased outcome of this trial
25
. 
Case Dzhugashvili v Russia
26
  established two principles of the Court that could be 
applied in similar cases. It has to do with the grandson of Joseph Stalin claiming 
violations under Articles 6, 10 and 14 of European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Court, however, found the claim to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention. 
The claim was brought to the Court, because Russian courts did not find a violation of 
applicant's rights in regards to an article addressing the Katyn tragedy in 1940 and 
referring to Stalin as “a bloodthirsty cannibal”. The Court acknowledged that 
discussion of Stalin generates  
[..]exceptional public interest and requires additional reflections and a profound 
historical study, and that is why it cannot be restricted as it lies beyond the sphere of 
law as a manifestation of the elements of the civil society in the Russian Federation.
27
 
However, the term "a blood cannibal" in Court's opinion was clearly “metaphorical 
and figurative, given the article’s context”28. This reaffirms that the publicised 
information has to be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable reader and cannot 
be taken literally every time. Furthermore, the Court also saw fit to mention that one 
cannot rely on other's right under Article 8 as it is non-transferable in nature.
29
  
Continuing with the principle of a reasonable reader, in the case Nikowitz & 
Verlagsgruppe News v Austria
30
 the Court found violation under Article 10 by 
Austrian courts as they did not protect the journalist's right to contribute to a debate of 
general interest with means of satirical commentary. The article at hand concerns 
athlete's injury and his competitor's imaginary words "Great, now I’ll win something 
at last. Hopefully the rotten dog will slip over on his crutches and break his other leg 
too". The competitor sued the outlet for defamation and won the proceedings on the 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., para 51 
23
 Sciacca v Italy, no. 50774/99, 11 January 2005 
24
 Ibid., para 28 
25
 Ibid., para 27 
26
 Dzhugashvili v Russia, no. 41123/10, 9 December 2014 
27
 Ibid., para 9 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., para 24 
30
 Nikowitz & Verlagsgruppe News v Austria, no. 5266/03, 22 February 2007 
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basis that some readers would misunderstand the satirical article and would think that 
there is relevant basis for such statement. The ECtHR disagreed with national courts 
and ruled based on the fact that satirical publication cannot be judged by focusing on 
those readers that are unable to understand a clear humorous passage.
31
  
However, in case Chauvy & Ors v France
32
 the Court set a clear constraint and duty 
on Article 10 of the Convention by ruling in essence that one cannot contest history or 
allege a different version of historic events without adequate research and sufficient 
critical analysis of sources.
33
 It concerned a book written based on testimony of Klaus 
Barbie (the infamous Gestapo regional head) in regard to arrests of Resistance leaders 
in 1943. The claims in book were written in bad faith and the right of reputation of 
individuals in this case outweighed the right to freedom of expression.
34
  
2.3 Conclusion 
ECHR case law helps to determine the scope of the Article 10 and its interaction with 
other rights given by the Convention and national legislations. With the help of 
aforementioned cases, it is easier to define where the line can be drawn when it comes 
to freedom of expression. The Court has established a test to balance the two rights of 
the same standing, respectively, Article 10 and Article 8. The test includes 
determining (1) whether the information contributes to a debate of general interests; 
(2) whether the concerned person is well known; (3) the prior conduct of the 
concerned person; and (4) the content, form and consequences of the relevant 
publication. Notwithstanding, there are several other factors worth considering, for 
example, if photos are part of the publication, it has to be determined whether they 
concern the publication and whether they themselves contribute to a general interest 
of public and are necessary in a democratic society. Furthermore, the Court also has 
established the fact that the damages paid under Article 8 are not only there to address 
the violation, but also for further deterrence of violations of the same kind. The 
difference between public and private persons has been addressed a lot by the Court, 
clarifying that in its opinion the right to private life should be much higher to those 
that only operate in private capacity as oppose to those that use or have used media 
and press for their own gain and benefit. ECHR case law has also laid out the 
important distinction between value judgements (opinions) and factual information as 
long as the publication is written in good faith and using reliable and precise data.  
Moreover, offensive and shocking information is also protected under Article 10, if its 
necessity in a democratic society can be justified. Likewise, unreasonably long and 
disproportionate ban on information even of sensitive and confidential nature cannot 
be justified under Article 10. Additionally, Court has reiterated that any publication 
has to be viewed from the view-point of a reasonable reader, therefore metaphorical 
and satirical texts cannot be taken literally and fall under protection of the right of 
expression. The Court has also stated that the right to claim violation under ECHR are 
                                                 
31
 Ibid., para 9 
32
 Chauvy & Ors v France, no. 64915/01, 29 June 2004 
33
 Ibid,, para 19 
34
 Ibid. 
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not transferable in nature. However, there are some circumstances that fall outside the 
protection of Article 10, such as publication about someone involved in ongoing 
criminal proceedings, especially regarding private persons, as it can influence the end 
result of the case. The right of freedom of expression also does not protect those 
contesting history without proper research and adequate critical analysis of the 
respective information. The Court has also left a lot of factual determinations to 
national state’s margin of appreciation as the state courts are in a better position to 
judge the facts. Further this work will go into national laws and compare them to each 
other and international standards regarding the right to freedom of expression. 
3. CRIMINAL LAW APPROACH TO DEFAMATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Although European states, especially those forming European Union, advocate for 
democracy and fundamental freedoms around the globe, they still lack behind in 
international standards on freedom of expression. According to IPI (International 
Press Institute) report
35
 only two
36
 out of twenty-eight Union member states have 
changed their legislation to fit the situation nowadays, other twenty-five have kept 
some form of defamation and insult laws as a part of their Criminal Codes. 
Professionals in the legal field and press have called for de-criminalization of the 
respective offenses and provision of adequate legal tools for defendants against 
possible abuses of the existing vagueness of laws. Too often the nature of the 
violation does not match the proposed penalty; in short, the punishment 
disproportionately restricts the freedom of expression. This has a chilling effect on 
press, which holds a fundamental role in educating public, demanding the 
responsibility from public servants and contributing to public debate in general. 
However, this is not to say that infringement upon somebody's right to reputation and 
public image should not be followed by fair consequences, but it is necessary to weigh 
out the effect of the punishment against the legitimate aim of the law in a democratic 
society. Although it may seem that criminal penalties exist only on paper and in 
reality other laws are applied in the relevant cases, the IPI report has found that in the 
last five years only in at least fifteen EU countries journalists have been convicted 
under criminal defamation laws (i.e., a criminal punishments such as fines or prison 
terms were imposed).
 37
  This chapter will start with describing the current situation in 
the European Union member states that have criminal provisions addressing 
                                                 
35
 International Press Institute (IPI) (2015). Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union. A 
comparative overview for journalists, civil society and policymakers. Vienna, Austria. [online] 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/out-balance-defamation-law-european-
union, Accessed at: May 14, 2018 
36
 United Kingdom, Ireland, Romania. Defamation and insult were repealed as criminal offences in 
Romania with the adoption of the new Romanian Criminal Code in January 2014, however, no civil 
legislation addressing defamation has been adopted, and the laws continue to be abused. [online] 
available at: www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/romania-at-odds-over-controversial-law-02-10-2016, 
Accessed at: May 17, 2018    
37
 International Press Institute (IPI) (2015), p.11., para 3 
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defamation by focusing on three factors – imprisonment, distinction between public 
and private persons and the threat that is vague laws. In the second chapter of this part 
the danger of such approach and the need to abolish it will be discussed. 
 
3.2 As far as imprisonment 
Although the European Court of Human Rights has clearly ruled opposite of 
imprisonment in cases of defamation, the above mentioned IPI report has found some 
form and term of imprisonment to be applicable in 20 Member states of the European 
Union.
38
 The highest possible prison sentence is to be found in Section 373 of 
Slovakian Criminal Code
39
, which prescribes for up to 8 years of imprisonment for 
defamation. Furthermore, this provision also does not excuse situations such as satire, 
or possible contribution to debate of societal interest, where the communicated 
information is of high credibility and as precise as thorough research would provide. 
It also does not distinguish between protection of public and private persons, which, 
as already discussed, should be a universal standard in democratic societies. As the 
IPI report points out  
[..] because criminal proceedings necessarily involve the power of the state and often 
involve no financial risk to the offended party, there is a real danger that such 
provisions will be misused by prominent figures or invoked for inappropriate 
purposes
40
. 
However, a maximum of 2 years of imprisonment is applicable in as many as 15 
Member states.
41
 Furthermore, this type of punishment is not only archaic remains of 
the past, such states as Italy still sentences journalists with prison sentences. In 2015 
Roberto D’Agostino was sentenced to 9 months in prison for  
[..]defaming a Genoa prosecutor, Alberto Lari, after republishing an article from the 
Italian newspaper L’Espresso that raised questions over the prosecutor’s wife’s recent 
promotion.
42
  
Only 2 years prior to this ruling another one involving prison sentence was rendered 
by Italian Courts. In Belpietro v Italy
43
 the defendant was sentenced four months in 
prison, the ECtHR, however, found that although "plaintiff’s conviction as such was 
not contrary to Article 10”44 a violation of freedom of speech had occurred 
nevertheless “due to the degree and nature of the sanction imposed”45. 
                                                 
38
 International Press Institute (IPI) (2015, p.11., para 1 
39
 Slovakian Criminal Code, s 373 
40
 International Press Institute (IPI) (2015), p.7., para 2 
41
 International Press Institute (IPI) (2015) 
42
 International Press Institute, (2015). Italian journalist given prison sentence for defamation. [online] 
Available at: http://legaldb.freemedia.at/2015/03/05/italian-journalist-given-prison-sentence-for-
defamation/, Accessed at: 6 May 2018 
43
 Belpietro v Italy, no. 43612/10, 24 September 2013 
44
 Ibid., para 3 
45
 Ibid., para 4 
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3.3 Distinguishing between public and private persons 
Democracy is based on the principle of holding those in power accountable for their 
behaviour and actions in public as well in private context. Acceptable criticism in 
regards to public persons must be considerably higher than that regarding private 
individuals. Directly as well as indirectly elected offices must be open to scrutiny as 
in their hands rest the powers of the state. However, that is not fully reflected in the 
laws of the majority of member states of the EU. Moreover, in six European Union 
member states instead of lessening the punishment in regards to public officials, they 
choose to go the other direction and elevate the criminal punishment for defamation.46 
Furthermore, fourteen states have separate provisions protecting public officials and 
figures against reputational harm, and a dozen states have codified separate provisions 
against insulting the head of the state together with state “objects”, including the state 
itself, its institutions and traditional symbols (e.g. flag, anthem, coat of arms etc.).47 
Moreover, the aforementioned Report claims that more than ten states provide for 
procedural advantages to public officials in cases of defamation, which: 
[typically mean] that whereas private individuals must bring criminal cases to court 
on their own or must file a complaint in order to initiate a police investigation, public 
prosecutors can take action on their own initiative when the offended party is a public 
official.”48  
Only Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Romania and the 
United Kingdom out of twenty-eight states do not specify for any of the two types of 
above-mentioned form of firmer protection for public officials.49 
3.4 Vagueness of laws 
The IPI Report also points out that alarmingly many criminal codes contain 
defamation provisions, which are dangerously broad and penalize vague and uncertain 
claims and even value judgements that may harm “dignity” or “honor”, which as 
concepts by themselves are not clearly defined, therefore open to possible abuse. 
Moreover, some states do not provide for “dissemination of false information and 
ideas” as a requirement for bringing a defamation claim, possibly protecting public 
officials from necessary scrutiny in a democratic society. 
For example in Portugal defamation is defined as vaguely as “alleging a fact or 
formulating a judgment (or reproducing such) about a third person that is offensive to 
that person’s honour or reputation”50. Furthermore, in case of Portugal, one of the 
foremost experts on free expression and Lisbon-based human-rights attorney Teixeira 
da Mota, when interviewed, expressed the view that Portuguese courts  
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[..]has traditionally placed a high value on the rights to honour and reputation and 
considered freedom of expression a second-class freedom compared to those rights. 
Even today there remains in many cases a tendency to place too much value on the 
words, image, and reputation of powerful figures when weighed against critical 
opinions about those figures. Courts continue, at times, to not distinguish between 
assertions of fact and value judgments, which obviously ends up harming freedom of 
expression.
51
 
Similarly, Polish defamation laws provide for attribution “to another person, a group 
of persons, an institution or organisational unit, conduct or characteristics that may 
discredit them in the face of public opinion”52. This provision is clearly dubious and 
open to misuse and abuse by the applicants and neglects any tools for protection to 
journalists, as it does not prescribe for neither intention, nor falsity, nor proof of harm 
done and does not draw distinction between factual information and value judgements  
Next chapter will argue why such attitude towards defamation threatens the most 
basic principles of democracy and human rights in general, as well as address the need 
for abolishing such practice. 
 
3.5 Dangers of Criminal Provisions addressing 
defamation 
Many scholars have written about the important role of freedom of expression, expert 
Mogens Schmidt
53
 claims that it “constitutes a cornerstone in any democratic society 
and forms a solid and fundamental basis for development”54. Without such 
fundamental principle, societies would not be able to achieve progress and 
development of most kind. It can be even claimed that “the right that guarantees 
freedom of expression underpins all other human rights and democratic freedoms.”55 
If one is not entitled to the right to freely seek, receive and impart ideas and opinions, 
it is hardly possible that he will benefit from other rights that have been granted to 
him.
56
 Furthermore,  
[it] is more and more generally accepted that freedom of expression and freedom of 
the press are of importance for the "three D's": Development, Democracy and 
Dialogue. In many studies researchers have documented the correlations between a 
free press and the three D's. Without an open space for the marketplace of ideas to 
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flourish, societies fail to progress by any measure on the human, social, and economic 
development scale.
57
 
Democracy “requires citizens to reflect and debate in order to enable the political 
leadership to transform their will into policy”. It is about accountability and good 
governance, which demands utmost scrutiny, when it comes to actions of leaders and 
allows to “engage in full and open debate about priorities and actions”58. Evidently, 
objective criticism, even when harsh and controversial, can foster understanding and 
expand knowledge, which ultimately leads to better and more informed decision 
making. Nevertheless, in the meantime, the law also pursues to safeguard one from 
the harm that could result from defamatory allegation directed towards him, and at 
that point, if it or the facts on which it is based is untrue, the law may intervene and 
decide that it becomes illegitimate. However, as discussed above the right to freedom 
of expression has to be treated as one that supports the democratic foundation of the 
state, so for any restrictions to be introduced, they have to be specifically designed to 
eliminate only the cases, where real threats of unjustified harm have or are likely to 
come about. Moreover, the restrictions “have to be derived from the relevant 
international legal standards”59.  
Consequently, from the right to freedom of expression follows the doctrine of 
freedom of the press as it is the continuation of the respective individual’s right, 
which is extended to the media.
60
 “Freedom of the press is nothing more, nothing less, 
than the right of the people to know.”61 The function of the media is to provide 
information to those, who want to know, and therefore, together with such function it 
also has to accept the accompanying duties and responsibilities. As important as the 
right to free speech is, it cannot be used to justify infringement upon the rights of 
others, each right has to interact with the rest, and therefore, while exercising free 
speech, one has to respect the dignity of fellow humans, particularly those already on 
the margins of the society.
62
 However, offence by itself is not a legitimate ground to 
restrict free speech.
63
 Joaquin P. Roces
64
 claims that the main responsibility of the 
press is to report on the opinions and views of the minority, and groups that usually 
identify themselves with dissenting sentiments.
65
 Nonetheless, if restrictions are 
imposed they have to comply with the following principles: 
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(1) they must be clearly and narrowly defined; (2) they must be applied by a body 
which is independent of political, commercial or other unwarranted influences, and(3) 
in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and which is (4) subject to 
adequate safeguards against abuse, including the right of access to an independent 
court or tribunal.
66
 
The freedom of speech should abide by the general standard that true statements 
cannot be followed by penalties, and moreover, that even hate speech
67
 cannot be 
addressed by criminal provisions, unless the author has the intention to incite 
discrimination, hostility or violence.
68
 Mogens Schmidt even emphasizes the fact that 
no “offenses involving freedom of expression should ever be considered under a penal 
code”69. This is due to the fact that “compared to civil defamation, criminal 
defamation takes the protection of reputation to a more serious level, bringing the 
state into its enforcement”70. Robert C. Post71 claimed that in democratic societies the 
need for criminal laws battling reputational harm would disappear. These 
developments are the result from the understanding that public officials are 
subservient to the public. Therefore, criminal defamation laws, especially those 
providing wider protection for officials should be left to the authoritarian past of 
Europe. If not, progress will resist taking place.
72
  
3.6 Conclusion 
Criminal defamation laws are still very much alive in Europe and that should raise a 
concern within the democratic community. Even provisions on paper should be 
enough for alarm; however, it is the reality as the press continues to be prosecuted and 
convicted under criminal codes in the past several years in the majority of EU 
member states. Most states also have kept imprisonment in their laws as the possible 
punishment in defamation cases, and Italy has precariously issued two prison 
sentences over the last five years. Besides, the majority has further chosen to provide 
for more protection in cases regarding public officials than private ones, raising 
questions about the most basic societal rights in democratic regimes. As one more 
significant problem, it is worth mentioning the broadness and ambiguity of existing 
laws addressing defamation and insult, which give the possibility of abuse for the 
purpose of “saving face” in cases, where ideally public officials and figures should be 
held under the utmost scrutiny. This presents a threat to the democratic societies in the 
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European Union and demands for abolishment of current practices. However, one 
definitely has an interest in an effective mechanism of defence against false and 
malicious attacks from the press in cases resulting in no public benefit; therefore, the 
next paragraph tries to argue for the efficiency of civil law provisions protecting from 
reputational harm.  
4. CIVIL LAW APPROACH TO DEFAMATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Firstly, it is important to state that victims of deceitful allegations, especially those 
imparted to public, can and often do experience negative consequences of 
professional and personal nature, which ought to be adequately addressed. Lacking 
the mechanism for effective defense against false or intimate claims about one’s life 
can lead to serious consequences that otherwise would not likely occur, e.g., loss of a 
job, exclusion from society, discrimination etc. Information of this kind can subject 
the wider public to biased and inaccurate conclusions about a particular person, which 
can ultimately lead to erroneous decisions. However, instead of applying archaic 
criminal provisions to deal with such situations, countries should transform and 
update the relevant laws and make them a part of the Civil Code, while at the same 
time giving legal tools to defendants to balance the right of freedom of expression 
with the right of reputation. This chapter will first go through defamation legislation 
of the two European states, which have shifted from criminal approach to 
comprehensive civil approach, namely the United Kingdom and Ireland in detail, and 
then turn to American method of addressing potential reputational harm by going 
through the history and relevant decisions of the Supreme Court concerning freedom 
of speech and defamation. All three of these nations have been chosen to highlight 
their best practices and to examine the ability of efficient tackling of defamation with 
the help of the civil law in order to achieve the ends of this paper and present a draft 
proposal that would fit the current situation in European Union in regards to 
defamation. 
4.2 UK Defamation Act 2013 
In the year of 2013 United Kingdom drastically changed their defamation laws partly 
because it was seen as a “libel73 tourism” destination as it was very easy to bring a 
claim in courts (also for foreigners) and partly because journalists and press lobbyists 
finally won the fight for adequate protection and a right to impart information of 
societal interest.
74
 The government claims that the new law reverses the chilling effect 
on freedom of expression that the old law was tolerating even when a legitimate 
debate was at stake. UK Justice Minister Shailesh Vara acknowledged that 
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[..] some journalists, scientists or academics have faced unfair legal threats for fairly 
criticizing a company, person or product. These laws coming into force represent the 
end of a long and hard-fought battle to ensure a fair balance is struck between the 
right to freedom of expression and people’s ability to protect their reputation.75  
Firstly, the new law does not provide for any criminal penalties regarding defamation. 
Secondly, previously the burden of proof on the applicant was only to prove that the 
public’s estimation of the claimant would be lowered as a result of the comment, but 
with the new Act coming into force, the applicant has to additionally prove that the 
defamatory comments “has caused serious harm or are likely to serious cause harm to 
the reputation of the claimant”76 Furthermore, when it comes to commercial bodies, 
the new Act has added the requirement of serious financial loss caused by the 
statement for it to be even considered defamatory.
77
 This section raises the bar for 
bringing a claim so that only appropriate cases can be adjudicated in courts.
78
  
Moreover, the defenses of ‘justification’ and ‘fair comment’ have been replaced with 
‘truth’ and ‘honest opinion’ in the new law.79 The defence of truth is necessary in any 
democratic society as it safeguards not only the press freedom, but also underlines the 
assertion that malicious publication claiming false and unverified information should 
not be covered by the right of freedom of expression. This subsection even goes 
further and allows the defendant to reasonably protect him/herself, if some of the 
claims in the publication do not amount to absolute truth and does not infringe upon 
the right of reputation as long as the disputed ones are substantially true. 
The second defence in Act of 2013 concerns the distinction between factual 
information and value judgement, the importance of which has been already 
mentioned in the Chapter 1 and 2 of this thesis. It puts the burden of proof upon the 
defendant to demonstrate that the disputed statement was not factual information, but 
an honest opinion, and the third subsection additionally requires a demonstration of 
the substantial basis for such claims.
80
 Fourth subsection makes it clear that not only 
there has to this basis, but it also needs to either come as a result of existing facts or 
anything asserted to be a fact in a privileged statement
81
 prior to the disputed 
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publication. It also points out the importance of “honest person” as the defense would 
fail if the defendant did not him/herself hold the opinion expressed in the publication, 
but claimed it to be his/hers as oppose to somebody else’s, and even then he/she has 
the responsibility of reasonably ensuring the truthfulness of the opinion that has been 
published in the disputed publication
82
. 
Moreover, as it should apply in a democratic society, the third defense of imparting 
“publication on matter of public interest” to society has been laid out in the UK 
Defamation Act 2013. This defense provides protection for the defendant if he/she 
demonstrates that the disputed publication or part of it was of societal interest and 
he/she had a basis to reasonably believe so.
83
 Later subsections concern the duties of 
the courts to determine the fulfilment of conditions laid out in subsection (1) of this 
defense. Such as, while determining whether the statement was in public interest and 
whether it was reasonable to think so, the court must seek for editorial judgement
84
 if 
necessary as well as apply this defense irrespective of whether the statement 
complained of is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion.
85
 
In conclusion, this legislation reasonably complies with the international standards on 
freedom of expression. The law provides for adequately strong requirements to bring 
a claim in court, and also arms the defendant with tools that could be used to protect 
his right to impart information while at same time sets standards for the honesty, 
factual credibility, accuracy and necessity of such information. This defamation - 
specific legislation has managed to strike a fair balance between the two competing 
rights provided by the European Convention of Human Rights. It has to be mentioned 
that this chapter only analyses a part of the Defamation Act 2013 as the law goes 
further in detail in regards to possible defenses, which were omitted from this paper 
due to lack relevance in regards to the chosen topic. Further this chapter will turn to 
Irish legislation to look at their technique in achieving the same ends. 
 
4.3 Irish Defamation Act 2009 
Irish Defamation Act 2009 shares a lot of similar provisions with the current UK 
legislation on this subject. However, the definition of “defamatory statement” for the 
purposes of Irish law is “a statement that tends to injure a person’s reputation in the 
eyes of reasonable members of society”86. Unlike in the UK, there is no requirement 
for serious harm to be done, but additionally there is a requirement to determine 
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whether reasonable person would see such statement as defamatory for it to be 
actionable under law. Furthermore, to claim tort of defamation
87
 in Ireland the 
defamatory statement has to be published by any means to at least one person, other 
than the one concerned.
88
 Irish Defamation Act also provides for many of the same 
defenses that can be used by the defendants during proceedings, such as the truth, 
absolute and qualified privilege
89
, honest opinion, differentiation between allegation 
of fact and opinion and fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public 
interest.
90
 Nonetheless, there are several other defenses one can plead in Ireland. In 
section 22 of the Act an “offer to make amends”91 is introduced as a defense, the 
amends shall:  
(a) be in writing, (b) state that it is an offer to make amends for the purposes 
of this section, and (c) state whether the offer is in respect of the entire of the 
statement or an offer [..] in respect of— (i) part only of the statement, or (ii) 
a particular defamatory meaning only. 
Anyhow, pleading under this section takes away the right to plead any other 
defense.
92
 Furthermore, Irish law also grants the defense of “Apology”, which can be 
used for the purpose of mitigating the damages caused by the defamatory statement. 
This legal tool is particularly helpful, if the defendant has made a mistake, when 
publishing the article, and does feel either responsible or party responsible, and is 
willing to take some blame for the statement, or for the consequences thereof. 
Moreover, under law this apology does not imply any liability of the defendant and is 
not taken into account, when deciding on liability for the statements made
93
, nor it 
can be provided as evidence of the liability of the defendant in any civil proceeding 
therefrom
94
. 
Furthermore, this Act also acknowledges the “defense of consent”, where the burden 
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of proof lies on the defendant to demonstrate that the plaintiff had given his consent 
in regards to the statement in question
95
. Last defense that has been included into 
Irish Defamation Act, but not in the UK one, can be found in Section 27 of the 
respective law and it is the “defense of innocent publication”. This Section gives the 
defending party the ability to submit evidence to prove the fact that he or she did not 
play a role in the publishing of the defamatory statement.
96
 In deciding on the 
eligibility of this defense, the relevant court has to determine the extent in which the 
person could be held responsible for the content of the statement in question or the 
choice to publish it, as well as circumstances surrounding the publication and 
defendant’s previous conduct or character.97 
Ultimately, Irish Defamation Act 2009 provides sufficient legal tools for defendants 
to prove under law the lack of their liability in regards to defamation that occurred, or 
the necessity and benefit of the respective statements to appear in democratic society. 
Furthermore, from the act analyzed above, it would be important to emphasize the 
additional defenses of “offer to make amends”, “apology”, “consent”, “defense of 
innocent publication”, and the requirement to consider each claim in regards to 
defamation from the perspective of “a reasonable member of society”. Now the 
chapter will shift from European jurisdictions to the situation in the US, and go 
through the historical development of the current scope of freedom of expression as 
well as address the preconditions needed to satisfy for the defamation case to be 
actionable under law. 
4.4 Situation in the US 
4.4.1 First Amendment and its historical development 
To comprehend standards regarding freedom of expression and defamation outside 
the European Union, this chapter will look at and analyze the relevant statutory laws 
and precedents in the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the US or 
the United States) as the direction taken by the respective government and courts are 
substantially different from that of the rest of the developed world. First and foremost, 
as the standards set by ECHR is not directly binding upon the US; the beginning of 
this chapter will look at the Constitution, respectively the First Amendment of the Bill 
of Rights and its history, and afterwards the case law with reference to this provision. 
The First Amendment reads as following:  
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances
98
. 
For the purposes of understanding the scope of this provision, it must be mentioned 
that the Supreme Court has extended the protection afforded under this right to apply 
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to the entire federal government even though it was only expressly applicable to the 
Congress.
99
  
However, James Madison
100
, who participated in the creation of the Constitution, 
produced the first and following draft version of the First Amendment, which is 
important as it addressed the freedom of speech explicitly (the religion clauses were 
later added by the Senate)
101
: 
The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to 
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of 
liberty, shall be inviolable.
102
  
The presence of the Founding Father’s concern with such provision of freedom proves 
the different view that the US leaders held in that moment of its history in respect to 
their European counterparts, who placed reputation and the right of state to interfere 
and restrict higher than this personal liberty. Furthermore, the strong protective view 
taken by the American judicial system of the right laid out in the Bill of Rights has a 
long history and has been highlighted as very essential even by legal scholars in 
eighteen century. Sir William Blackstone
103
 in his work wrote:  
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from 
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to 
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the 
freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he 
must take the consequences of his own temerity.
104
 
However, only in recent times complete recognition and acceptance of the theory that 
the freedom of expression, particularly freedom of speech, is protected by the First 
Amendment by prohibiting not only prior constraints, but also most possible 
consecutive penalties and punishments has come about. This advance started short 
after the First Word War as the Court's shift toward this position began in its 
consideration of limitations on speech and press. Moreover, in a landmark case New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan
105
, which concerns an ad placed in a newspaper (New 
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York Times) regarding violations of rights of black people in Montgomery, Alabama 
in the year of 1964, the Court could say with full consensus: 
[..]we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.
106
 
After considering the scope of protection provided to freedom of expression and 
requirements needed to satisfy if any form of restriction is to be introduced, it is clear 
that the scope is wide and the Court places a significant value on the First Amendment 
rights. Nonetheless, there are several categories of free speech that enjoy none or 
partial protection in the US courts, these categories have developed through case law. 
However, regarding defamation, it can be deduced that as long as the concerned 
statement in defamation case is not directed to incite imminent danger and is not 
likely to produce such danger, words constituting respective statement is not inflicting 
injury or do not tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace as well as the 
statement is not considered to fall under the prohibition of obscenity, such statement 
is protected by the First Amendment. However, a “potentially defamatory” statement 
constituting a part of publication of pure commercial-nature will be much harder to 
defend in the Court room. Further this chapter will go into pre-conditions under which 
one is able to sue for defamation and what protection is provided for the defendant in 
such situation within the jurisdiction of American courts. 
 
4.4.2 Defamation in the US 
 
Private Individuals 
In order to claim for a statement or a publication to be defamatory and receive a 
satisfactory ruling in the US, the plaintiff, who is a private individual, is required to 
prove four elements: (1) concerned statement has to be false; (2) concerned statement 
must be ‘published’ to a third party, who cannot also be the person who is being 
defamed; (3) if the concerned statement is ‘of public concern’ the person who has 
published it must also be guilty of negligence regarding the publication; (4) the person 
about whom the defamatory statement is made must be ‘damaged’107 by the 
statement.
108
 As oppose to European jurisdictions, the burden of proof rests upon the 
plaintiff, which is a major difference as the possible satisfaction of these four 
elements requires a fair amount of evidence and a substantial damage done to the 
victim of defamation. The paper will now go into these elements to understand why 
and how they came about, and why it would be necessary to include such components 
in European Union legislation. 
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False requirement 
This requirement owes its existence to the case Crown v. John Peter Zenger
109
, which 
was brought to the Court as early as 1735. Peter Zinger was a printer of the New-York 
Weekly Journal, which was the Province's first independent newspaper. The 
newspaper with the help of articles, lampoons and satire made accusations of the 
Governor William Cosby
110
, calling him tyrant and claiming his administration is 
violating the rights of people. Governor’s lawyers were leading an examination to 
determine whether the statements constituted the crime of seditious libel.  
Seditious libel was defined as the intentional publication, without lawful excuse or 
justification, of written blame of any public man or of the law, or any institution 
established by the law.
111
  
For the purpose of issuing an indictment against Zenger, two grand juries were 
established and the evidence was presented, but they did not find him guilty of the 
crime. Following this, the Governor ordered to publicly burn the issues of the 
newspaper. However, after applying to the Court of Quarter Sessions for authorization 
of such act, such permission was not received. The Cosby administration then 
resolved to proceed against Zenger without the necessary grand jury indictment, and 
Cosby’s allies on the court issued the warrant for arrest and Zenger was put in New 
York’s Old City Jail in 1734. However, after several mistakes by Zenger’s counsels, 
he was appointed a new lawyer – Mr. Chambers, who empaneled an unbiased jury for 
the upcoming trial. At the ending of Zenger’s counsel’s speech, Andrew Hamilton112 
gave his famous speech; he asked the jury to consider the truth of the published 
statements and finished with these famous words: 
The question before the Court and you, Gentlemen of the jury, is not of small or 
private concern. It is not the cause of one poor printer, nor of New York alone, which 
you are now trying. No! It may in its consequence affect every free man that lives 
under a British government on the main of America. It is the best cause. It is the 
cause of liberty.
113
 
The jury, unsurprisingly, found him “not guilty” of the crime of defamation. The case 
did not, however, establish a binding precedent regarding freedom of expression, but, 
more importantly, it changed the legal thought regarding what constitutes defamation, 
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and long after that was responsible for the enactment of protection embodied in the 
First Amendment.
114
 
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the general requirement of “the truth” is still 
unfortunately not popular in European jurisdictions. However, it most definitely 
should be included in all laws devoted to defamation, because one of the most 
important elements of functioning democracy is the ability and the need to inform the 
public on matters of factual accuracy and the right to receive impartial and truthful 
information. 
“Made public to third party” requirement 
This requirement is universal and also found in most other jurisdictions; however, in 
the United States one of the first cases establishing such requirement is Simpson v. 
Mars, Inc.
115. Case concerns Mrs. Simpson’s termination from her position in the 
Ethel M. Chocolates, Inc. factory, which is a subsidiary of Mars Inc. Senior 
Supervisor contacted her and told she was terminated based of sexual harassment 
allegation made by another female employee in the company. Mrs. Simpson brought a 
defamation case to court claiming that the alleged sexual misconduct was published to 
Simpson’s co-workers; however, the defendant responded that this information was 
only made available to necessary agents of the company, so it has to be considered 
under the privileged statement exception. Nevertheless, the Court rejected that 
position by adopting the rule that for defamation case to be accepted by court the 
plaintiff only needs to prove that the defendant made the concerned statement 
available to someone else than the plaintiff. It is, however, a defense for corporate 
bodies to prove privileged right to the information in question.
116
 
Negligence   
This element requires for the plaintiff to prove, if not defendant’s intention to publish 
the defamatory statement, at least negligence on his or her part to stop such statement 
from being published. This element came about in the case Barnes v. Clayton House 
Motel
117
, where the defendant, a manager of a motel, wrote a letter and sent in to the 
plaintiff’s address accusing him of not paying the bill and taking the property of the 
motel with him. The letter was sent as certified mail with return receipt requested. 
However, it was picked up by the maid, who brought it to the plaintiff’s wife, who 
took it upon herself to read it. Afterwards, she introduced it also to the maid and her 
husband, who brought the case to the court claiming defamation. This general rule 
was mentioned in the case:  
If one sends a libelous statement through the mails, addressed to the person defamed, 
with the expectation or intention that it will be read by another person as a matter of 
course, and such other person so reads it, there is a publication; but where the sender 
is "not reasonably chargeable with knowledge that a third person might 'intercept' and 
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read the libelous matter before it reached the person allegedly defamed," there is no 
publication.
118
  
Taking into account the wording of the ruling, it can be concluded that the statement 
cannot be understood as “published”(therefore the claim is not actionable), if the 
author or the distributor took all reasonable action to ensure that the statement is only 
communicated to the addressee, and could not anticipate its availability to a third 
person.  
Requirement of “special damages” 
Firstly, exception to the main rule has to be laid out, and this is the case with a special 
category of defamatory statements that - namely “defamation per se119” This category 
includes four types of false allegations that by themselves constitute such great harm 
to someone’s reputation that they are actionable without any evidence of incurring 
“special damages”. The false defamatory statements for which damages are presumed 
are:  
(1) indications that a person was involved in criminal activity; (2) indications that a 
person had a "loathsome," contagious or infectious disease; (3) indications that a 
person was unchaste or engaged in sexual misconduct; (4) indications that a person 
was involved in behavior incompatible with the proper conduct of his business, trade 
or profession
120
  
These four types of allegations generally tend to be accepted in courts as defamatory 
even without evidence of actual harm done, however, this principle varies from state 
to state, and therefore different definitions apply as well as different requirements 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, other statements claimed under 
defamation require comprehensible proof. In the case Briggs v. Brown
121
 the court 
gave its opinion of “special damage” requirement, and it states as following:  
If the publication is not privileged and is not actionable per se because the publication 
as ordinarily understood will not naturally and necessarily cause injury, damages may 
be recovered upon proper allegations and proofs for such special injury as is the 
natural and proximate, though not necessary, consequence of the wrongful 
publication.
122
 
Furthermore, the plaintiff has higher chances of receiving a satisfactory judgement if 
the injury sustained is of pecuniary
123
 nature. This principle has evolved through 
history and is strictly applied today, therefore it is  
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[..] not usually enough for the plaintiff to plead that the publication of the slander has 
humiliated or embarrassed him, or has been productive of mental anguish, or even 
that actual sickness has been brought on.
124
 
However, the standard for private individuals to provide proof of “special damages” is 
considerably lower than that of public figures as opportunities for the former ones are 
not as effective for possible rebuttal against defamatory statements in question. 
Therefore, the state is interested in providing wider protection to plaintiffs, who 
appear in private sphere only, in this regard.
125
 
Public figures
126
 
The main difference in protection of public and private individuals, in regards to 
freedom of expression and defamation, is the conflict with the right of a public 
person, rather than that of a private one, to be secure from injury to reputation 
resulting from the publication of defamatory material.
127
 It is only logical in a 
democratic society to be focusing on the public’s right to be informed, to know and to 
discuss issues of public interest, so people involved in political affairs and 
administration of the state have to satisfy few extra elements. 
Additional requirement regarding proof of “special damages” 
This element clarifies the fact that for public figures in the US it is close to impossible 
to collect damages for anything else than tangible financial losses that have occurred 
as a result of the published defamatory statement in question. In the famous case 
Falwell v. Flynt
128
 the Court ruled that public figures, who sue for defamation, cannot 
collect damages for emotional distress.
129
 This principle does not apply for private 
persons as it is possible to collect damages for emotional harm suffered. 
Actual Malice 
This is another additional element for which one has to provide proof in order to bring 
a claim for defamation. As mentioned above, this is an element only applicable to 
public figures. “Actual malice” includes such actions as publishing statement that one 
knew not to be true at the time of publishing or having a reckless disregard whether 
the statement was in fact true.  
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In the case St. Amant v. Thompson
130
 the Court affirmed the precedent established in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
131
 in cases of public interest that  
[..]reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have 
published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant, in fact, entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless 
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
132
 
 
Conclusion 
It can be drawn from this sub-chapter that a private individual can bring charges 
against a personal responsible for the defamatory action if he/she satisfies four 
conditions: (1) statement has to be false; (2) statement must be published; (3) the 
personal responsible for the defamatory statement has to be proven to be negligent; 
and (4) “special damages” incurred by the defamatory statement has to be proven. 
However, a public figure must also satisfy the additional requirement of (5) proof of 
actual malice as well as for the “special damage” requirement considerably more 
proof of pecuniary loss has to be provided 
. 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
The civil approach to defamation and the different elements thereof of the three 
nations considered in this chapter are sufficient for determining an efficient way of 
dealing with conflicting rights that have to be addressed in the respective cases. 
Primarily, from the information above it can be concluded that the jurisdiction, where 
it is the most difficult to bring a case, is the United States. This comes as a result of 
the fact that in the US mainly the plaintiff has to bear the burden of proof and provide 
most evidence of the “defamation” occurring as oppose to both European 
jurisdictions, where generally the defendant is required to provide defense against 
such offense taking place. Nevertheless, the UK does place it upon the plaintiff, who 
is a private person, to prove that the comments, claimed to be defamatory, were 
published, therefore available to a third person, and caused serious harm or are likely 
to cause serious harm, and furthermore, if the action is brought by a commercial body, 
the plaintiff has to provide evidence of serious financial loss caused by the statement.  
However, in Ireland the plaintiff only needs to prove that the published statement 
tends to injure the reputation of a person from the perspective of a reasonable person. 
As to available defenses, both, UK and Ireland, equip the defendant with the “defense 
of the truth”, “honest opinion based on a reasonable assumption”, “absolute and 
qualified privilege”, and “fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public 
interest”. Furthermore, Ireland gives four following additional defenses - “offer to 
make amends”, “apology”, “consent” and “defense of innocent publication”. In 
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regards to United States, firstly, it has to be mentioned that potentially “defamatory 
statement” is not protected under the scope of freedom of speech as afforded by the 
First Amendment if it constitutes a part of form of expression directed to incite 
imminent danger and is likely to produce such danger, words constituting the 
potentially “defamatory statement” are inflicting injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace as well as if the respective statement is considered to fall under 
the prohibition of obscenity. Additionally, if the potentially “defamatory statement” is 
a part of commercial speech, the scope of protection will also be considerably smaller.  
Secondly, the US courts, instead of giving a list of defenses as legal armor to 
defendant, have developed a substantial amount of case law establishing requirements 
for the plaintiff, which comes to be longer in case of public figures. Private persons, 
who claim to be victims of defamation, have to provide evidence that satisfies these 
four pre-conditions only in order for a case to be actionable within US courts: (1) 
concerned statement has to be false; (2) concerned statement must be ‘published’ to a 
third party, who cannot also be the person who is being defamed; (3) if the concerned 
statement is ‘of public concern’ the person who has published it must also be guilty of 
negligence regarding the publication; (4) the person about whom the defamatory 
statement is made must be ‘damaged, with exception in cases, where the statement 
happens to be “defamatory per se”. However, as already discussed, extra pre-
condition of (5) proof of actual malice has to be fulfilled if a public figure wants to 
bring a case in court. Such situation has resulted from the rationally held belief that 
presumes that the position of a private person falling victim of defamation is 
inherently worse than that of a public one.  
Combination of the approaches taken by all the three countries above by choosing the 
most appropriate method in addressing each of the requirements and elements related 
to defamation, as well as picking the best possible legal tools for defense against 
wrongful allegations and against illegitimate limitations on freedom of expression, 
while at the same time taking into account the ECtHR case law, will serve as the 
material basis for the draft proposal of harmonized approach to defamation in the EU, 
which will be laid out in the concluding part of the Thesis. 
However, the next chapter will propose the possibility of implementation of self-
regulatory bodies that are concerned with the enforcement of “responsible 
journalism”, i.e. rules composing journalistic code of ethics, for further prevention of 
cases having to do with illegitimate defamation and other violations. Such bodies 
could serve the purpose of unburdening the courts from cases concerning journalistic 
rights and obligations, as well as, thanks to field-specific specialists, they could 
manage to do so without the threats of limiting press freedom that could arise from 
outside regulation. 
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5. RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM 
5.1 Reynold’s defence 
Almost 20 years ago in the historic decision of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd
133
, 
the judges knew the significance of striking an appropriate balance between the two 
possibly-conflicting rights – the right of freedom of expression and the right to 
reputation. The most important contribution concerning the judgement belongs to the 
Lord Nicholls, who formulated ten considerations of “responsible journalism”, 
observance of which could lead to a release from civil liability for the false 
defamatory statement published.  
This defense crystallized into a two-part test. A newspaper or broadcaster has to show 
(1) that the article in question concerns a matter of public interest; and (2) that the 
newspaper engaged in responsible journalism in creating and distributing the 
article.
134
  
This is a non-exhaustive list of those considerations: (1) the seriousness of the 
allegation; (2) the nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject-
matter is a matter of public concern; (3) the source of the information; (4) the steps 
taken to verify the information; (5) the status of the information; (6) the urgency of 
the matter at hand; (7) whether comment was sought from the plaintiff; (8) whether 
the article contained the gist of the plaintiff's side of the story; (9) the tone of the 
article; (10) the circumstances of the publication, including the timing.
135
 
All ten of these factors provide considerable assistance when deciding a case 
concerning defamation; however, such requirements are nothing new to the journalists 
themselves as all of these are covered by the code of ethics for the members of the 
profession. Undoubtedly, it is important to safe-guard the right to free speech, but it is 
just as important to make sure that the information society receives is of high quality 
and credibility, especially nowadays, when the diversity and amount of it have 
increased tenfold. This well-known decision provided for the law to understand and 
evaluate journalistic practices in regards to defamation. However, the next sub-
chapter will argue that courts are not always the most efficient bodies determining 
whether the particular defamatory statement has been published by taking into 
account “responsible journalism” practices and that different bodies have to be 
established/developed for this purpose.  
5.2 The possibility of self-regulatory bodies as first 
instance in defamation cases 
As with most professions, journalists are also taught and expected to abide by a 
professional code of ethics. It is no surprise that the “rules” in this code already covers 
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all ten of the aforementioned considerations. The idea of self-regulatory
136
 institutions 
for journalists is nothing new as their main social justification for existence consists in 
controlling the public and de facto powers for the benefit of society.
137
 The purpose of 
such self-regulatory bodies is the exercise of social responsibility to ensure that 
neither journalists nor their employers violate the society’s right to information.138  
Society of Professional Journalists
139
 has outlined four general parts of its code of 
ethics applicable in this field. First confirms the necessity to be accurate and fair, as 
well as requires honesty and courage in gathering, reporting and interpreting 
information. The second part highlights the importance of minimizing harm, which is 
of highest relevance in regards to the subject of this paper. It claims that ethical 
journalism needs to treat sources, subjects, colleagues and members of the public as 
human beings deserving respect, and that journalists should weigh out the need for 
information of the society against the potential harm and discomfort of individuals. 
Furthermore, it points out that the “pursuit of the news is not a license for arrogance 
or undue intrusiveness”140 for journalists. This part of the code also provides for 
respect for the reasonable assumption that private people should have greater ability 
to control information about themselves than public figure and those, who seek 
power, influence or attention. Afterwards the code goes into the obligation of 
journalists to serve primarily to the public, and this demands independence of 
representatives of the profession as well as institutions employing such professionals. 
The last part concerns accountability and transparency in the field. Such behavior 
means assuming responsibility for one’s work and explaining one’s decisions to the 
public. This part encourages the specialists to develop a dialogue with the public 
about journalistic practices, coverage and news content thereof. Such activity would 
be essential if the press and media have interest in educating the public of their right 
to receive quality information and the necessity of critical analysis of any such 
information. It also further asks for acknowledgment of mistakes and prompt and 
prominent correction of them, while explaining such corrections and clarifications 
with carefulness and clarity to those seeking them. Such obligation is also directly 
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related to defamation instances by press, where the damage can be undone by means 
of accountability and awareness of the need to make right the committed errors. 
141
 
A self-regulatory body in the field of journalism, which is capable of enforcing such 
virtues and behavior as those constituting above-mentioned professional code of 
ethics, would be of great help to the judicial system as it would provide alternative 
path to determine whether defamation has been committed in any particular instance, 
whether the concerned statement has been published out of “responsible journalism” 
practices as well as in seeking damages for defamatory publications. This alternative 
procedure could be less expensive and time-consuming, but it would also allow the 
applicant to get necessary reparations without the involvement of the judicial system.  
[..] the fact that a profession wants to regulate itself means, positively, that it is a 
living and very dynamic body”, because “self-regulation has nothing to do with self-
censorship”.
142
  
However, if a decision by the self-regulatory body is dissatisfactory, one could turn to 
courts to seek an appropriate remedy. In this case, the court needs not to start the 
considerations of the involved factors from a scratch; it could just correct the 
conclusions of the respective body if necessary. 
Furthermore, the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism produced a 
report titled “A free and  pluralistic  media  to  sustain  European democracy”, where 
it argued that the desired preference of media is understandably some system of self-
regulation rather than control from outside institutions. This could be based on the 
potential threat of censorship and unnecessary restrictions on freedom of expression. 
However, it also laid out the unpleasant reality that was reflected in the Leveson 
report (GB)
143, which offered evidence of multiple ways the concept of “self-
regulation” has been interpreted as “no regulation”, and has led to abuses of privileges 
offered to journalists, breach of ethics standards and even acts prohibited in criminal 
provisions of the state. Such findings are alarming and prove that pro-journalistic bias 
are as disconcerning as biases created out of political conviction or financial interests. 
The report also concluded that there are no universally-fitting institutional setup at the 
moment, which would help greatly with the issue at hand, as the results produced by 
such self-regulatory bodies, even dealing with the same complaint, would be rich in 
diversity from state to state due to local culture, development and interpretation of 
ethical norms.
144
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5.3 Conclusion 
The judicial system has taken some interest in the protection of what can be called 
“responsible journalism” on matters of public interest and has assumed partial role in 
the development of this practice. Already in the end of the last century the right to 
exercise “responsible journalism” was defended by British courts, where 10 factors 
for consideration (Reynold’s defence) were drafted in order to provide for similar 
cases in the future. However, it can be argued that courts are not the best fit for this 
important task and institutions able to self-enforce the journalistic code of ethics could 
achieve these ends better. Furthermore, such self-regulatory bodies could provide an 
alternative mechanism to first instance courts, and may make the process cheaper and 
faster, which is important in situations, where reputation is at stake. Nevertheless, no 
one-fits-all solution in the EU is possible due to tradition and cultural differences in 
member states, however 28 able institutions would relieve the courts if additional 
burden and may ensure more efficient tackling of the problem. However, now the 
thesis will turn to the concluding part, which will address the research statement 
posed in the beginning as well as propose the minimum necessary elements regarding 
defamation legislation that should exists in the European Union jurisdictions. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The concluding chapter will start with giving a brief overview of the findings related 
to the first part of the research statement presented in the introductory chapter, and 
then the second part will offer an outline, where necessary elements of civil 
defamation-specific legislation will be laid out.  
The research statement: The existence and potential abuse of criminal laws addressing 
defamation limits and endangers the right to freedom of expression, which is 
necessary in a democratic society, and the possibility of civil laws tackling 
defamation.  
As to the first part of the statement, which concerns the existence of criminal 
provisions penalizing defamation and what such approach means for democracy in the 
EU, several factors should be mentioned. Firstly, the finding that only two countries 
out of EU28 have repealed criminal defamation provisions and have created 
comprehensive legislation, which is capable of tackling defamation with the help of 
the civil law, is an alarming tendency that requires the greatest attention. Such 
situation neither complies with the internationally recognized standards on freedom of 
expression, nor does it comply with the binding precedents of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The respective Court has ruled over and over that criminal penalties 
are not applicable as a legitimate restriction on freedom of expression, as they are 
disproportionally restrictive and does not meet the desired ends. Furthermore, it 
should be mentioned that the goal of defamation laws should be the action of 
balancing out the right to freedom of expression, on the one hand, and the right to 
reputation, which falls under the right to private life, on the other hand. Both of these 
rights are protected under the European Convention of Human Rights, therefore, 
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given an equal importance that must be respected and enforced by the legislators and 
the judiciary in the relevant jurisdictions. Besides, it can be argued that without 
adequate protection of the right to freedom of expression, many other rights cannot be 
utilized. The basic ability of the society to receive information is closely tied to the 
freedom of the press, which is the continuation of the respective individual’s right to 
freedom of expression. The right of the public to obtain precise, credible and quality 
information on the matters of public interest shall be taken into account when 
designing any form of legislation that would potentially restrictive the free flow of 
information and ideas. Moreover, the thesis referred to an idea that the more 
democratic a society grows to be, the less need for criminal defamation laws there 
should be. From this it could be drawn that a reverse situation should raise an alarm in 
the European community. By this reasoning, the author holds the first part of the 
research statement to be true - the existence and potential abuse of criminal laws 
addressing defamation does limit and endanger the right to freedom of expression, 
which is necessary in a democratic society. 
After addressing the first issue posed in the research statement, it is now time to turn 
to the second one and analyze the ability to tackle defamation with the help of the 
civil law. In essence, each member of society has an interest in protecting and 
defending his private life, and for the reasons of this thesis, particularly the right to 
reputation. Reputation can take time to be built, but it can be ruined by very few 
words, therefore, an effective protection mechanism to deal with such situations has to 
be created. To find out examples of such mechanism, this thesis looked at two strong 
civil defamation legislations namely, the United Kingdom Defamation Act 2013 and 
Ireland Defamation Act 2009. Additionally, for a point of reference outside the EU, 
the United States was chosen as it has developed a powerful case law in this regard, 
which offers considerably wider protection to freedom of expression than its 
European counterparts. To answer the second half of the research statement, the latter 
part of the conclusion will propose elements, which have been determined to be 
essential in order to address defamation. First off, minimum requirements, which have 
been deemed to be necessary for the plaintiff to bring the case in court, will be looked 
at.  
Requirements for the plaintiff to bring a case in court: 
For the purpose of upholding one of the most basic principles of democracy, which is 
the right to receive truthful and precise information, as a general rule (1) the 
concerned potentially “defamatory statement” has to be false in order for it to be 
considered in the courtroom. Additionally, if such statement reflects opinion rather 
than fact, it has to be based on wrong or unreasonable factual basis, or one that a 
reasonable person would not believe to be truth. Such element emphasizes the 
principle that statement claiming false and unverified information shall not be 
protected under law. Moreover, as to this requirement in relation with private persons 
exceptions can apply based on circumstances and at discretion of the court. Some 
exceptions would include cases, where the plaintiff has suffered serious harm as a 
result of personal fact being published to a wider public, and where the availability of 
this information is of less importance then the violation of the right to a private life. 
These exceptions rest upon the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, which 
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have stressed the different protection levels regarding private and public figures.  
 
As the next requirement, (2) the concerned statement has to be published, therefore 
available to a third party. Although relatively straightforward, this element 
encompasses the principle that even the most offensive remark is not sufficient to 
claim defamation, if it has been intended to be only seen or heard by the addressee. 
This requirement calls for evidence that the potentially “defamatory statement” has 
been published as a result from either intention or negligence, implying the possibility 
of further harm occurring to the reputation. 
 
Thirdly, (3) proof of serious harm to reputation that has resulted from the concerned 
statement or is likely to result therefrom has to be provided. Furthermore, to receive 
pecuniary damages, a sum based on reasonable and clear calculations with factual 
basis has to be presented; enforcing some limitations on possible damages that can be 
awarded and reaffirming that disproportionate restriction are a threat to freedom of 
press. Moreover, in case of commercial body suing for defamation, the serious harm 
must be complemented by proof of financial losses resulting from the concerned 
statement. Such element acknowledges the non-personal factor of a claim of this kind, 
and asserts that commercial bodies cannot receive damages for some types of harm 
such as injury to feelings, or moral detriment. In regards to public figures, the 
damages, especially, if the concerned statement is of public matter must be tangible 
and clear, speculations of the possibility of partially directly or indirectly related harm 
that may take place shall not be accepted by the court. 
 
Fourthly, the plaintiff has to prove that (4) the statement has affected him directly. 
This has been included for the purpose of maintaining the precedence set by the 
European Court of Human Rights, which has stated that the right to reputation is of 
non-transferable character. Lastly, (5) the defendant has to be the author of the 
concerned statement, or the person under whose supervision the publishing of such 
statement took place. Such requirement has been deemed necessary, because cases, 
where the defendant has not been directly involved in publishing of the statement or 
has not committed negligence in relation to the respective publishing, should not be of 
burden to the judicial system. Now the thesis will turn to the minimum number of 
defenses that shall be provided for the defendant. 
 
Minimum defense mechanisms for the defendant: 
Firstly, the defendant (1) shall be able to claim the defense of qualified and absolute 
privilege, which have been afforded by all three of the analyzed jurisdictions. This 
defense covers situations, where the publication has occurred due to moral, social or 
legal duty or where the publication is made in relation to parliamentary, judicial, 
military occasion or where the expression is absolutely protected by the state. 
Necessity for such defense can be explained by the need for certain types of 
information to be fully protected under law.  
Furthermore, it is a defense for the defendant to argue that (2) the concerned statement 
was of public interest, and that it was published by taking into account “responsible 
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journalism” practices. This defense has developed as a result of the judicial system 
acknowledging the significance of the need for accountability in democracy. 
Especially important is the principle of holding those in power responsible for their 
behavior and actions in public as well in private context. Thesis supports the idea that 
acceptable criticism in regards to public persons must be considerably higher than that 
regarding private individuals as their actions are much closely tied with matters of 
public interest.  Direct as well as indirect public offices must be open to scrutiny as in 
their hands rest the powers of the state. However, the press also has a duty to comply 
with the standards of “responsible journalism” and ensure that the information the 
society receives is of high quality and credibility. No one has an interest in protecting 
defamatory form of expression, which does not contribute its share to the overall 
intelligence of the public. By stringently enforcing the journalistic code of ethics, the 
levels of qualitative journalism would increase, and the illegitimate defamation 
instances could be better avoided.  
Thirdly, sufficient (3) proof may be presented by the defendant of the prior consent of 
the plaintiff to the publication of the concerned statement. Fourthly, it is a defense for 
the defendant to provide evidence that he has published an apology in regards to the 
concerned statement or that he has offered to do so. Such defense may lead to 
mitigation of damages. The defense of apology is useful if some error has been 
committed by the defendant and he does feel partially responsible, and is willing to 
take some blame for the statement, or for the consequences occurring thereof. It has to 
be noted that the defense of “apology” does not constitute an express or implied 
admission of liability by the defendant, and is not relevant to the determination of 
liability thereof.  
All in all, the second part of the research statement has been proven to be attainable 
and there is a possibility of sufficient and efficient tackling of defamation with the 
help of the civil law. Combination of elements found in the three respective 
jurisdictions has led to an overview of necessary requirements as well as defenses 
presented above in the conclusion. Moreover, the thesis also raises the idea of 
introducing specialized self-regulatory journalistic institutions able to monitor the 
rights and duties of the press and serve as potential first instance in defamation cases, 
which would further lead to relieving courts of considerable amount of burden. 
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